Digital Gatekeepers Under § 19a GWB

Digital gatekeepers under German competition law

Germany was the first EU member state to introduce special competition rules for digital gatekeepers. Since January 2021, § 19a GWB has allowed the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) to designate an undertaking as being of “paramount significance for competition across markets” and then to prohibit specific practices without first having to prove dominance in a particular market or show anti-competitive effects in each case. The provision was designed for large digital ecosystems whose power extends across many markets and whose conduct can shape the competitive conditions for thousands of other businesses.

The German rules apply alongside the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), which the European Commission enforces against designated gatekeepers. The two regimes overlap but are not identical: § 19a GWB gives the Federal Cartel Office a flexible, case-by-case tool, while the DMA imposes fixed obligations directly. For businesses that depend on large platforms, such as app developers, online sellers, advertisers and publishers, both regimes provide new avenues to address practices that harm them. For the platforms themselves, § 19a GWB creates significant compliance obligations in Germany.

How the Federal Cartel Office designates digital gatekeepers

The first step is a designation decision. Under § 19a(1) GWB, the Federal Cartel Office can determine that an undertaking active to a significant extent on multi-sided markets or networks is of paramount significance for competition across markets. The criteria it must consider include, in particular, the undertaking’s dominant position on one or more markets, its financial strength or access to other resources, its vertical integration and activities on otherwise related markets, its access to data relevant for competition, and the importance of its activities for third parties’ access to supply and sales markets and its related influence on their business. The designation is limited to five years after it becomes final.

The designation itself does not prohibit any conduct. It is the gateway to the second step, in which the authority can prohibit specific practices. Appeals against designation decisions and prohibition orders under § 19a GWB go directly to the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) as the first and final instance (§ 73(5) GWB). This shortened route was intended to provide faster legal certainty in fast-moving digital markets.

The dates are taken from the Federal Cartel Office’s press release on Microsoft and its case pages. In the Microsoft decision, the authority stressed that the designation applies to the company as a whole, not only to individual products or services.

Practices that can be prohibited

Once a company has been designated, the Federal Cartel Office can prohibit it from engaging in the practices listed in § 19a(2) GWB. The list is broad and includes:

• self-preferencing, such as favouring the company’s own offers in the presentation of search results or pre-installing only its own offers on devices;
• impeding other companies in their business where the gatekeeper’s activities are important for access to markets, for example by preventing them from advertising their own offers or reaching customers through other channels;
• impeding competitors on markets where the company can rapidly expand its position, for example by tying or bundling its services without giving users sufficient choice;
• creating or raising barriers to entry through the processing of data relevant for competition, including making the use of services conditional on consent to data processing across services without sufficient choice;
• refusing or impeding interoperability or data portability;
• providing other companies with insufficient information about the scope, quality or success of services provided; and
• demanding disproportionate advantages for handling other companies’ offers, such as data or rights that are not strictly necessary.

These prohibitions do not apply where the practice is objectively justified. However, the burden of presentation and proof for the justification lies with the designated company. The authority can combine the prohibition with the designation in a single decision, and it can accept commitments or order remedies. The general abuse prohibitions in §§ 19 and 20 GWB continue to apply in parallel (§ 19a(3) GWB).

Enforcement practice so far

The Federal Cartel Office has used § 19a GWB in several proceedings. Some have been concluded after the companies changed their practices, for example in relation to data processing terms and the integration of services. In the case of Apple, the authority examined the App Tracking Transparency Framework, which requires third-party apps, but not Apple’s own apps, to obtain additional user consent before tracking for advertising. After a preliminary assessment in February 2025, the authority concluded the proceeding in August 2026 after Apple changed its rules for personalised advertising in apps, according to its Apple case page.

In the case of Amazon, the Federal Cartel Office issued a decision on 5 February 2026 prohibiting Amazon from applying price control mechanisms to sellers on its German marketplace and ordering it to disgorge economic benefits in an initial amount of about EUR 59 million, as described on its Amazon case page. Other proceedings, including one on Amazon’s brand-gating practices, were extended to include § 19a GWB. Companies affected by the practices of digital gatekeepers can inform the authority and contribute to proceedings, and they should follow published decisions closely, because they often set standards for the whole sector.

Relationship between § 19a GWB and the Digital Markets Act

The Digital Markets Act applies directly across the EU and imposes obligations on gatekeepers designated by the European Commission for their core platform services. Unlike § 19a GWB, the DMA’s obligations apply automatically, without a separate prohibition decision for each practice, and the Commission is the sole enforcer of the DMA itself. The DMA permits member states to apply national competition rules to gatekeepers, including rules on unilateral conduct, provided they do not undermine the DMA. Section 19a GWB therefore continues to apply.

In practice, the two regimes complement each other. The DMA covers specific core platform services, while a designation under § 19a GWB covers the whole company. As the Federal Cartel Office pointed out in its Microsoft press release, the DMA obligations applied at that time only to Windows and LinkedIn, while § 19a GWB allows it to address practices outside the scope of the DMA. The authority and the Commission coordinate their work. Our article on Digital Markets Act obligations explains the EU rules in detail.

What § 19a GWB means for business users

For companies that rely on digital gatekeepers to reach customers, § 19a GWB offers practical leverage. Practices such as preferential ranking of the platform’s own products, demands for data in return for better visibility, or restrictions on steering customers to other channels can be challenged. Because the burden of proof for any justification lies with the designated company, complaints can be effective even where the business user cannot fully explain the platform’s internal processes.

Business users can also bring civil claims. Infringements of prohibitions imposed under § 19a GWB, and of the general abuse rules, can give rise to claims for injunctions and damages before the German courts, which have specialised chambers for competition matters. Our antitrust damages team advises on such claims.

Illustration: a German app developer finds that a designated platform requires it to share detailed usage data as a condition for a prominent listing, while the platform’s own competing app is listed prominently without such a condition. The developer documents the terms and their effects on downloads and submits a complaint to the Federal Cartel Office, which can examine the practice under § 19a(2) nos. 1 and 7 GWB.

Compliance for designated companies

For designated companies, § 19a GWB requires a structured compliance approach for the German market: reviewing product design, ranking algorithms, data processing terms and contractual conditions against the list of practices in § 19a(2) GWB, and preparing evidence of objective justification where needed. Because a prohibition can be issued without proof of anti-competitive effects in each case, early engagement with the authority is often advisable.

Outlook for the regulation of digital gatekeepers

Section 19a GWB has become an established part of German competition law, and the Federal Court of Justice’s decisions on Amazon and Apple have confirmed the authority’s approach to designation. The law itself requires the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs to report to parliament on experience with the provision four years after its entry into force (§ 19a(4) GWB). Future amendments could therefore adjust the list of practices or the procedure, and companies should follow the legislative debate.

At EU level, the Commission is gaining experience with the DMA, including non-compliance decisions and specification proceedings, and the DMA itself provides for regular evaluation by the Commission, including whether the list of core platform services and the obligations should be changed (Article 53 DMA). Developments in cloud services and artificial intelligence are likely to play a role in that discussion. As the DMA matures, the relationship between EU and national enforcement against digital gatekeepers will continue to evolve. Practices that the DMA addresses directly may be pursued by the Commission, while the Federal Cartel Office focuses on conduct outside its scope or specific to the German market.

For business users, the practical lesson is that remedies against digital gatekeepers are available at several levels and can be combined. Choosing the right forum depends on the practice, the platform service concerned, the evidence available and the remedy sought: a quick change of terms, compensation for past harm or a precedent for the market. For platforms, consistent compliance across the DMA, § 19a GWB and general competition law reduces the risk of parallel proceedings. The interaction with the Commission’s planned guidelines on exclusionary abuse, discussed in our article on the exclusionary abuse guidelines, is a further point to watch.

How TRW & Co helps with digital gatekeepers

We advise business users and other affected companies on complaints and claims concerning digital gatekeepers under § 19a GWB, the general abuse rules and the DMA, and we advise digital companies on compliance with these rules. Our antitrust and trade team works with our digital platforms lawyers on these matters. To discuss a situation, contact us. This article provides general information and is not legal advice.